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Abstract
There are instances where the provider of an intervention, such
as surgery, has failed to obtain necessary informed consent from the
recipient of the intervention. Perhaps a surgeon has failed to warn the
patient that she may go into a coma, or even be killed, from the surgery.
Sometimes, as a result of this intervention, the recipient cannot give
informed consent to researchers for the release of their personal data
precisely because of the intervention. If they are in a coma, they
cannot be reached. Sometimes, this personal data itself can prove that
the provider of the intervention failed to obtain informed consent for
the intervention. For example, a personal ﬁle may include a consent
form that does not include warnings about the risk of falling into a
coma from the surgery. Paradoxically, those who cannot give informed
consent for the disclosure of their personal data on an intervention
may have been especially ill-informed about the repercussions of the
intervention. In such instances, should researchers ever use the data
and disclose the data in their research? In an attempt to demonstrate
when this dilemma may be relevant, and how it may be solved, I will
present a real-world case of this dilemma in my own empirical research
on refugees who agreed to repatriate to their countries of origin from
1
Israel. I will consider what theories on consent, if any, can help us
resolve this dilemma
1 Introduction
There are times when refugees want to return to the countries they ﬂed from,
despite the risks. When making such a choice, they may ask governmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations(NGOs) for help with ﬂights, travel
documents, and other assistance. Such services are provided by immigration
authorities, private companies, charities, and the United Nations, which has
repatriated millions of refugees over the last decade (UNHCR 2012). These
repatriation facilitators have a responsibility to ensure informed consent in
return. They therefore give refugees a set of questions to answer to ensure
they are informed and not repatriating as a result of coercion or duress, such
as fear of being detained or deported. Below are some of the questions asked
by one NGO in Israel which helped refugees return to Sudan and South
Sudan between 2009 and 2012:
Do you know people who have returned to Sudan from elsewhere?
If yes, what is their situation there?
What, if anything, would make you change your mind about...[going]
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back to Sudan?1
Each question was aimed at determining if a refugee was informed about
their decision, and not compelled by the Israeli government to leave. Each
answer would be recorded, transcribed, and ﬁled away in a secure ﬁle cabinet.
During my research, I asked the director of HIAS if I could look at the
answers refugees gave. The answers, I told him, could help determine if
refugees were fully informed about the risks of returning, and if they were
returning from detention. In other words, I would be able to determine if
refugees had given HIAS their informed consent to return to South Sudan
and Sudan. The director acknowledged the importance of the research, but
informed me that, to look at the answers, I needed to ﬁrst call those who
returned and ask them for their permission. If they consented to me looking
at their ﬁles, HIAS would give me copies of them.
Unfortunately, I could not contact all of those who returned. Many were
killed, and others displaced, possibly contrary to what HIAS had promised.
Others were living in extremely rural areas, unable to access telecommuni-
cations or safe and reliable roads, also living in conditions that were possibly
diﬀerent to what they expected prior to repatriating. Paradoxically, the
reason many could not give their informed consent to disclose their data,
meant to determine if they gave informed consent to repatriate, was pre-
cisely because they repatriated to a country without giving their informed
consent.
1HIAS Interview Form, Provided by HIAS in December 2012.
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This article attempts to establish when researchers should look at data
on refugees after they have repatriated, and cannot be reached. The issues
raised are applicable to other cases where researchers cannot ask individuals
for their consent to releasing their data, when the data is related to an earlier
intervention which itself had questionable informed consent. Importantly, I
focus on scenarios where the reason they cannot give their informed consent
to disclose their data is precisely because of the intervention.
This last aspect  that the intervention caused them to be unable to
consent to data disclosure  is important. To see why, consider the following
ﬁctional case. A doctor gives medication to a patient, never warning him that
he may fall into a coma. He takes the drug, and quickly loses consciousness.
Researchers ask the doctor if they can look at the consent form the patient
signed, and his medical history. I am sorry, the doctor responds, but I
cannot show you his data unless he consents, and he cannot consent because
he is in a coma. When following this rule of thumb, the doctor has less
of an incentive to warn patients of dangerous side eﬀects, knowing she is
unlikely to be held accountable for her failure to ensure informed consent in
the intervention. The doctor also has an interest in the patient staying a
coma, further ensuring she will not be held accountable. Perhaps the data
should not be disclosed. But if we can ﬁnd an ethical justiﬁcation to look at
it, this can ensure more ethical interventions.
In the following section, I will demonstrate that we cannot determine the
right course of action by appealing to classic theories of consent, which ask
what a subject's own preferences are. For, we often do not know enough
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about their subjective preferences, because we cannot contact them. In
Section 3 I argue that we should instead consider whether they have object-
given reasons2 to disclose their data. These are reasons a person has to
consent to an act, regardless of their subjective preferences. In Section 4 I
suggest we weigh these certain object-given reasons to disclose data against
possible subjective reasons not to disclose their data.
The article will draw upon examples from my own research on repatria-
tion of refugees in Israel back to South Sudan and Sudan between. Between
2005 and 2012, a signiﬁcant number of refugees crossed the border from
Egypt into Israel, after failing to secure refugee protection in Egypt. By
2009 there were 22,000 refugees in Israel, including 4,300 from Northern Su-
dan and 1,250 from present-day South Sudan. They were given informal
group protection by the Israeli government and not deported, but also not
recognized as refugees. Some had medical care and education, but many did
not. Some were arrested, but others lived in relative freedom.3
One private NGO, Operation Blessing International (OBI), began facili-
tating repatriation for them in 2009. In South Sudan, access to medical care
and other services was extremely week that year, and still is.4 It is also ille-
gal in Sudan to set foot in Israel, punishable by death. Concerned, OBI and
another NGO, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society(HIAS), asked refugees if
2Parﬁt 2011 ibid
3Y Berman, "Until our hearts are completely hardened: Asylum procedures in Israel,"
Hotline for Migrant Workers, 2011
4D Maxwell, K Gelsdorf, M Santschi, "Livelihoods, Basic Services, and Social Protec-
tion in South Sudan," Working Paper 1, 2012. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium.
Feinstein International Centre
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they were coerced into leaving and knew about risks. Both NGOs told me
they refused to facilitate misinformed or coerced returns. To validate these
claims, between 2012 and 2014 I travelled to South Sudan for four months
and to Uganda and Ethiopia for two months, as many had ﬂed or migrated
to these countries after return. The majority of the 121 individuals I in-
terviewed, in urban and rural areas, told me they thought there would be
employment, free healthcare, and free education in South Sudan. In the end
there usually was not. Many said they returned solely to avoid detention in
Israel or because their work visas were revoked
Amongst the individuals I interviewed, those I found it most diﬃcult
to contact were without cell phones, in refugee camps, and in rural areas
far from roads and safety. These individuals were also the least informed
about South Sudan before they returned, and the most harmed after they
returned. This suggests that, if we were to only view the pre-return data of
those I could call to ask for consent, there would be a bias towards those who
did give informed consent to repatriation, as these individuals were easier to
contact. Looking at all interview-based questionnaires would allow me to
fully determine the extent that repatriation was with informed consent. Yet,
this would be at the expense of returnees' right to privacy, and thus their




To consider what ought to be done, we might consider three theories of
consent, which focus on three distinct factors: autonomy, reasons, and time.
The ﬁrst theory considers what a person's autonomous preferences are. The
second theory considers what a person could have reasons to want, if they
are unable to say what their preferences are. The third theory considers
when we ought to accept a person's earlier consent as valid at the present
time. I will show that these theories, though helpful, are often unhelpful for
determining what ought to be done.
2.1 Autonomy
A person's decision is autonomous if they are fully informed and not coerced
into their decision.5 Sometimes decisions are without coercion or misinfor-
mation, but based on non-autonomously developed preferences. For exam-
ple, the the hopeless destitute may prefer their positions in life, but only
because of their position (Arneson 1994; Sen 1987). Other times, though,
a decision is made because of these conditions but to escape them, such
as the hopeless destitute accepting a low-paying job that improves their
conditions. It seems that such oﬀers are autonomous unless the oﬀer-giver
is also the agent that is doing the coercing. A wealthy factory owner who
steals from the poor to get the poor to accept lower salaries is coercing the
5TL Beauchamp and JF Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics, 6th edn. Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2009
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poor into their decisions, making them non-autonomous. Sometimes, the
oﬀer-giver is not coercing, but ought to help more.6 Imagine public ﬁreman
who oﬀers to put out the ﬁre for a desperate victim, but charges millions of
dollars. The victim's consent to this oﬀer is possibly non-autonomous. This
is not because the ﬁreman did any coercing  it is not her fault there was
a ﬁre. Rather, it is because she ought to put the ﬁre out for free or much
less than millions of dollars, because of her professional duties, the urgency
of the situation, or the fact she can for far less than millions of dollars.
There are two instances in repatriation that may involve non-autonomous
interventions. The ﬁrst is when an NGO helps a refugee repatriate without
obtaining their autonomous consent. The second is if researchers look at
their data without obtaining their autonomous consent.
One reason NGOs may fail to obtain autonomous consent when helping
with repatriation is if a refugee is repatriating because of government coer-
cion  such as detention. An NGO may be partly culpable of the refugee's
non-autonomous choice to return if the NGO has a duty to lobby to stop
government coercion but only helps with return. Similarly, if an NGO some-
how causes coercion, then they act unethically by helping with a coerced
return. This might be the case if an NGO, by helping refugees repatriate
from detention, frees up a detention cell, allowing the government to de-
tain a new refugee who otherwise would be free. A refugee's choice is also
non-autonomous if NGOs give false information, or fail to disclose pertinent
6Joseph Millum (2014) Consent under pressure: the puzzle of third party coercion.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17(1): 113127
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information. In summary, NGOs have failed to respect the autonomy of
refugees in repatriation if they have
1. Coerced refugees into repatriating or
2. Failed to fulﬁll their duty to help stop coercion or
3. Failed to inform the refugee about the risks of return
The second instance where autonomy is undermined is if researchers look
at the personal data of refugees who has returned against refugees' wishes.
Autonomy is also undermined if a refugee wants to disclose their data, and
cannot, because they cannot be contacted. In addition, those who were
coerced to return may have been forced to keep their data private at the
time of return. If they are in detention, they may accept a free ﬂight home,
and in accepting the ﬂight, are required to sign a data-protection form,
which states their data will not be disclosed without their express consent.
In other words, they are coerced into keeping their data private, because this
is a condition for their returning, and they are coerced into returning.
Similarly, if a refugee is ill-informed about the risks of return, a refugee
will be ill-informed about the risks of keeping their data private. For, she
will not know that, in keeping her data private, the NGO will not be held ac-
countable for giving misinformation. In general, outside the sphere of refugee
repatriation, misinformed interventions may entail misinformed consent to
keeping data private. If a doctor does not tell a patient that medicine might
put her in a coma, the doctor will also not tell a patient, If you keep your
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data private, nobody will ever be able to arrest or sue me for failing to tell
you about the risks of a coma. Whether the intervention itself had informed
consent can provide evidence as to whether the choice to keep data private
was with informed consent.
In order to determine whether data should be disclosed, we might con-
clude that diﬀerent policies should be implemented in two diﬀerent scenarios:
Consent Scenario 1: Researchers know from other evidence that an in-
dividual has not given valid consent for repatriation. For example, perhaps
a refugee has already been interviewed by a researcher after return, and
told the researcher that they were coerced into returning, providing further
evidence of their coerced return.
Consent Scenario 2: Researchers do not know if an individual has or has
not given valid consent for repatriation. The only data on refugee's return
is in their private ﬁle.
If refugees have not consented to repatriate, as in Scenario 1, this is
strong evidence they have not truly consented to keeping data private. It
would be less problematic to disclose their data. But even if we are fairly
certain refugees have not autonomously consented to repatriation, this does
not mean they now want their data disclosed. Some who returned do not
want to publicize information they feel is very private, such as their sexual
orientation. Individuals have a right to such privacy. Others may fear data
being leaked to government authorities, risking their lives in the country
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they now live in. While this may be rare,7 the more who see the data, the
greater the risks.8 I was told of one such leak from a major international
organization helping with return. These and other concerns may be in the
minds of refugees when they consent to keeping their data private. As such,
they were not necessarily coerced into their decision.
There is a more basic problem in disclosing data in Scenario 1. In such
scenario, we already know there was no informed consent to repatriation, so
there is no urgency in looking at the data. We already have evidence to hold
repatriation facilitators accountable. While it is true that there is greater
evidence that former refugees would consent to their data being disclosed,
there is less of a reason for researchers to disclose the data, and so less of a
justiﬁcation for their doing so.
In Scenario 2 we have no idea if those who returned were misinformed
or coerced into returning, and so there is a much stronger justiﬁcation for
looking at the data. But if we open up the ﬁle in Scenario 2, and ﬁnd out
they did consent to repatriate, then it seems the former refugees really did
consent to their data being kept private. For, they were fully aware of the
risks of return, and not coerced into returning, so were both aware of the
risks of keeping data private and not coerced into doing so. Moreover, even
if we open their ﬁle and see they did not consent to repatriate, we do not
know this until after we open their ﬁles. Their privacy is breached when we
7AP Schwab, Frank L, Gligorov N (2011) Saying privacy, meaning conﬁdentiality.
American Journal of Bioethics 11(11)(2011):4445
8T Schonfeld, JS Brown, NJ Amoura, B Gordon, You don't know me, but...: Access
to patient data and subject recruitment in human subject research. American Journal of
Bioethics 11(11)(2011)3138
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open their ﬁle before we have a justiﬁcation.
The route of the problem is that returnees cannot be reached. To consider
what to do, we might consider what is done in medicine when an individual
is in coma or mentally impaired, and so cannot give their informed consent.
Bioethicists emphasize that, in such cases, third parties should never see this
information.9 The literature emphasizes the problem of over-sharing: vulner-
able patients lack the capacity to understand the implications of disclosing
their data. But there is little emphasis on the problem of under-sharing:
vulnerable patients lacking the capacity to understand the implications of
not disclosing their data, possibly protecting doctors who failed to obtain
informed consent for an intervention.
In such cases, rather than never looking at the data, or always looking at
the data, perhaps we can ask what a person would have reasons to consent
to, if we could ask them. I will now consider this approach.
2.2 Reasons
Even when we cannot ask a person what they prefer, we can ask what they
would hypothetically prefer. There are two ways to determine this. We
could ask, What would a reasonable person want? This would involve ap-
pealing to what people generally want, such as safety, food, and shelter.
9B Dolan, Medical records: disclosing conﬁdential clinical information. Psychiatric
Bulletin 28(2004):5356; R Cushman, AM Froomkin, A Cava, P Abril, KW Goodman,
Ethical, legal and social issues for personal health records and applications, Journal of
Biomedical Informatics 43(5)(2010): S51-S55
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This is the approach often taken in medicine, when a surrogate that must
decide on behalf of a never-competent patient. For example, if a patient
has lived with the capacity of a six year old since childhood, a surrogate
may consider what is in her interests, rather than what she earlier stated
she wanted.10 We might similarly argue that, if a refugee has never stated
their preferences, then researches should consider what a reasonable person
would want. This approach, while useful in cases of never-competent pa-
tients, would be problematic in cases of refugee repatriation, as it ignores
refugees' unique subjective reasonable preferences, which as competent peo-
ple they do have, even if we cannot reach them. Rather than asking what
a reasonable person would want, we can ask, What would this particular
person want, were we to call them up and ask them? To answer this, we
can consider what they personally would have reason to want.
As before, there are two sets of reasons to consider: reasons to repatriate,
and reasons to disclose data.
It would seem that repatriation facilitators have committed an injustice
if a refugee who returned would have had no reasons to return had they
been given full information, and had facilitators provided assistance they
had a duty to provide. For example, imagine that the UN fails to help
refugees gain refugee status, refugees are detained, and the UN then helps
with repatriation. It would seem the UN has committed an injustice if the
refugees would have had no decisive reasons to return, had the UN fulﬁlled
10N Cantor, The bane of surrogate decision-making: deﬁning the best interests of never-
competent persons. Journal of Legal Medicine 26(2)(2005):155205
13
its duties to help refugees gain refugee status and be free from detention.
Conversely, some people would have returned regardless, because they had
other reasons to return, such as their patriotism or the fact that they missed
their families. For such returnees, it seems a lesser injustice has occurred,
because they would have returned even if they had not been coerced.
Let us now address the second set of reasons: whether a returnee now
has decisive reasons to consent to disclosing their data. This is related to the
ﬁrst set of reasons concerning repatriation. If an individual would have had
no reason to return if they had been informed and facilitators fulﬁlled their
duties, then returnees would likely have strong reasons to disclose their data
now. For, their decision to return was due to the failures of the repatriation
facilitators, and they would want to hold the facilitators accountable. If,
though, a refugee had good reasons to return even with full information and
freedom in Israel, then perhaps the refugee would now have little reason to
disclose their data. For, their decision to return was not impacted by the
failures of the repatriation facilitators.
Consider, for example, the case of Simon, a refugee who was told false
information by NGOs in Israel, but who says would have returned even if he
was given accurate information, as he knew what to expect from personal
sources. As such, he does not blame OBI for any wrongdoing. Nor does
Joseph. He returned in 2011 with tens of thousands of dollars in savings and
opened a successful Playstation arcade in Juba. He assured me he would
have returned regardless of how OBI and HIAS acted. Consider also the case
of Yasmin. She says she was misinformed by OBI about medical care and
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security in South Sudan, but would have returned even if more information
was provided to her, because she missed her family, and wanted to start a
restaurant in Aweil. All three  Yasmin, Simon, and Joseph  would have
little reason to disclose their data. For, they would not feel it necessary
to hold the NGOs accountable, as they did not feel they were coerced into
returning.
If having reasons to repatriate impacts whether one has reason to disclose
data, then researchers should perhaps act diﬀerently in three scenarios.
Hypothetical Consent Scenario 1: Researchers know from other evidence
that an individual would have had no reason to repatriate had they been
well-informed, non-coerced or/and repatriation facilitators fulﬁlled their du-
ties. For example, researchers may have interviewed refugees after returned,
and learned that they returned for reasons unrelated to coercion or misin-
formation.
Hypothetical Consent Scenario 2: Researchers know from other evidence
that an individual would have had reason to repatriate had they been well-
informed, non-coerced or/and repatriation facilitators fulﬁlled their duties
to help them in other ways.
Hypothetical Consent Scenario 3: Researchers do not know, from other
evidence, if an individual would or would not have had reason to repatri-
ate were they informed, non-coerced or/and repatriation facilitators fulﬁlled
their duties to help them in other ways.
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In Scenario 1, because individuals would have no reason to return had
they been informed and non-coerced, we also suspect that returnees would
want us to look at their data. Importantly, we are still unsure if there was
actually a lack of informed consent in the repatriation; we only know that
the refugees say they had no reasons to return other than coercion or misin-
formation. As such, so there is a good justiﬁcation for looking at the data,
to ﬁnd out if they were coerced or misinformaed. However, these scenarios
are rare. If we know an individual wouldn't have decisive reasons to re-
turn if she had been better informed, non-coerced, and/or provided other
assistance, we probably also know if she was, in fact, misinformed, coerced
and/or not provided other assistance. This would make looking at the data
pointless in many cases. More worryingly, as before, if we look at their per-
sonal data and ﬁnd out that returnees did, in fact, return without coercion
or misinformation, then it seems they have not faced a major injustice, and
would not have had a good reason to consent to disclosing their data after
all. Furthermore, even if an individual was coerced and misinformed in repa-
triation, and only returned for these reasons, they may have other reasons
to prefer privacy over disclosure. As before, they may fear information will
leak, or their data may be of a private nature they do not want to reveal,
such as their sexual orientation.
In scenario 2 individuals would have likely consented to return had they
been better informed and less coerced. Looking at their data may still be
ethical, because they may still feel wronged from the misinformation mis-
informed or coercion. Furthermore, though many claim they preferred to
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return regardless of coercion or misinformation, they perhaps developed this
preference because they are now forced to stay in South Sudan regardless.
Returnees like Yasmin, who claim would have returned even if they had
been better informed, may still want to hold repatriation facilitators ac-
countable for their failure to inform. But though this is true, these individ-
uals seem to have a lesser reason to consent to disclosing data compared to
those who would have had no reasons to return had they been informed and
non-coerced.
In Scenario 3, we know nothing before looking at their personal ﬁles.
We may look at the data and ﬁnd out that they had very good reasons to
return, regardless of coercion and misinformation. We would then realize we
have unjustly violated their privacy. We only have the facts that justify data
disclosure after disclosing the data, in which case we may ﬁnd out we have
no justiﬁcation at all. The dilemma remains: if we do not look at the data,
we may never know that repatriation was without informed consent. If we
look at the data, we may undermine the principle of informed consent for
data disclosure.
There is one possible solution. We can employ what I call a double
hypothetical. Let us say we try to answer the question Would this person
hypothetically want X? and know that they likely want X if they like Y.
But we have no on whether they like Y, so we instead ask Would they hy-
pothetically like Y? For example, let us say I go to the shop to buy soft
drinks for me a friend, not knowing if my friend wants orange soda or coke.
I instead ask, Does my friend like oranges? but do not know this either.
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I then consider if, hypothetically, she might like oranges. I recall that my
friend once ordered a citrus fruit salad at a restaurant, and hypothesize that
she likes oranges because she once ate a citrus fruit salad, and so hypoth-
esize she prefers orange soda because she hypothetically like oranges. This
hypothetical prediction to determine another hypothetical preference is not
particularly good inferential reasoning, but it may be necessary when there
is little information to draw upon.
Rather than ask, Did the refugee have actual reasons to consent to
repatriate if they were not coerced, helped in other ways, and informed? we
can start oﬀ by asking Would the refugee have hypothetically had reasons to
repatriate if they were not coerced, helped in other ways, and informed? If
the answer is Yes then this is evidence that they would not hypothetically
consent to data disclosure. For example, I knew before meeting Joseph they
he had been planning for years to open his own Playstation business. I also
knew it was illegal for him to do so in Israel, and that he had saved money for
an investment. I could hypothesize, before speaking to him in South Sudan,
that he would have had reasons to return to South Sudan irrespective of
whether he was coerced into doing so. Similarly, I could hypothesize that
others had no reason to return. Many had no family connections in South
Sudan, no capital saved, no basic education to ﬁnd a job, and were of a
minority group persecuted by the government of Sudan or South Sudan.
Based on this, we can hypothesize that they would have had no reasons to
return had they been fully informed and not coerced to leave. Based on this,
we can hypothesize that they would consent to data disclosure.
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As such, we can distinguish between three relevant scenarios:
Double Hypothetical Scenario 1: Based on other evidence, we can hy-
pothesize that an asylum seeker would not have consented to repatriate had
they been well-informed, non-coerced or/and repatriation facilitators fulﬁlled
their duties.
Double Hypothetical Scenario 2: Based on other evidence, we can hy-
pothesize that an asylum seeker would have consented to repatriate had
they been well-informed, non-coerced or/and repatriation facilitators fulﬁlled
their duties.
Double Hypothetical Scenario 3: We cannot even hypothesize if they
would have consented to repatriate had they been well-informed, non-coerced
or/and repatriation facilitators fulﬁlled their duties.
In Scenario 1, because we can hypothesize that an asylum seeker would
have no reasons to repatriate had they been informed or un-coerced (or
assisted in other ways), we can hypothesize that she would have had good
reasons to consent to data disclosure after repatriation. In Scenario 2, we
hypothesize that an asylum seeker would have returned regardless, and so
hypothesize that she would not have reasons to consent to data disclosure.
In Scenario 3 we still have the same problem of not knowing anything until
we look at the data, but there are far fewer cases like Double Hypothetical
Scenario 3 compared to the earlier Hypothetical Consent Scenario 3. For,
cases with almost no information about a returnee can still be included
in Double Hypothetical Scenarios 1 and 2, so long as we have some small
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amount of information to make an hypothesis.
There are still cases, however, like Double Hypothetical Scenario 3, where
all the information available is in the personal ﬁles. More importantly, we
are on normatively shaky ground, with so many hypotheticals. Hypothetical
consent is already quite removed from actual consent; hypothesizing reasons
based on another hypothesis of reasons seems quite distant indeed. It can
lead to clearly inaccurate conclusions about people's preferences. Imagine
I am trying to ﬁgure out what soda my friend wants. I remember that my
friend likes getting her vitamin C and detests reﬁned sugar, and so hypoth-
esizing that she prefers oranges over other foods, and so hypothesizing that
she would prefer orange soda over water. Clearly, there is no vitamin C in
orange soda and plenty of reﬁned sugar. The hypothetical reasoning based
on another hypothesis fails to remotely capture what my friend wants.
If we care about subjective preferences, this may be all we have to work
with. We want to avoid simply resorting to what refugees' said they wanted
before they repatriated. They signed a data protection form, while possibly
being told, You will be ﬁne in South Sudan. When they weren't, we will
never know that they were told otherwise.
2.3 Time
Perhaps the problem is that we are relying on an earlier decision for the
present time. If earlier decisions are invalid when enough time has lapsed,
we can look at the data, regardless of of a refugee's earlier stated preferences.
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To consider when such an action would be legitimate, we must consider
when, in general, earlier consent is valid for the present time. In many
instances, it clearly is. If you consent to sell your car, and ownership has
been transferred, this consent is binding. Other times, earlier consent is
invalid if you change your mind, as when a patient consents to surgery and
then, a moment before the operation, tells the doctor, Stop! The diﬀerence
may be that, in the ﬁrst instance with the car, there is no risk to bodily harm;
in the second instance with the surgery, there is, and so earlier consent can
be reversed. Indeed, some harmful consent will lapse automatically after
some time, regardless of whether the consenter has explicitly stated that
she changed her mind. If a patient consents to surgery in a year from now,
a doctor should re-conﬁrm her consent a year from now. He should not
take her earlier consent as valid for the current time. Similarly, if a person
says, Punch me in a year from now the consent seems invalid a year from
now, unless we can ask them in a year from now, Do you still want to be
punched? If they cannot be asked again, it seems punching them is wrong,
because there is much harm from punching, and little gain. This is not to
claim that self-harming consent should be viewed as invalid when it is for
the present time.11 Rather, self-harming consent for the future should be
invalid. So while a person saying punch me now has possibly given their
consent now, a person saying punch me later has not given their consent
for later.
When refugees earlier consented to keep their data private, they were
11V Bergelson, Consent to harm. In: Miller F, Wertheimer A (eds) The Ethics of
Consent: theory and practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013
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consenting to future harm. This is because, in keeping their data private,
they were giving facilitators the opportunity to hide any misconduct and
negligence, giving facilitators one less reason to inform refugees of the risks.
Refugees would then return, who otherwise would not have, and ﬁnd them-
selves displaced or without basic necessities. As such, refugees' earlier con-
sent to keep data private was a form of consent to future harm. If we cannot
consent to being punched in a year from now, perhaps refugees cannot con-
sent to keeping their data private in a year from now, when doing so is
harmful in a year from now. As such, once a year passes, looking at data is
justiﬁed.
There is a problem with this claim. Even if refugees agreeing to keep data
private was a form of self-harm for the future, it is not harmful now. The
repatriation has happened, and their lives cannot be made better or revived
by disclosing their data. In this way, it contrasts to a person agreeing to
being punched in the future; the future punch will hurt, and not punching
in the future will not. Data privacy may hurt in the future, but keeping
it private will not, once it is too late. In general, it would be wrong to
treat earlier consent as illegitimate because of its harmful consequences on
the current time, in cases where there is simply nothing to prevent these
harmful consequences from transpiring in the current time.
There is a second consideration, other than self-harm. We can consider
what a person will retroactively endorse. 12 This is necessary in cases where
a person's earlier decision was not valid consent  or might not be  and their
12Parﬁt, On What Matters, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011
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current decision is also without valid consent, either because their judgment
is impaired or they cannot be reached. This, too, is unhelpful. We have no
idea what a former refugee will retroactively endorse after we disclose the
data, because it is unlikely researchers be able to reach them in the future.
We could solve this by applying the idea of hypothetical consent to
the idea of retroactive endorsement. We can hypothesize what they would
retroactively endorse, were we able to contact them. This, however, sim-
ply shifts the problems of hypothetical consent I earlier discussed onto the
problem of retroactive endorsement. We cannot even make a preliminary
prediction of what they will later want until we ask them, which is im-
possible, or until we look at their data, which would be unethical without
ﬁrst knowing what they will later want. We could sometimes make a vague
hypothesis without either asking them or looking at their data, but often
we cannot. Furthermore, it seems wrong to rely on so many hypotheticals.
We could be terribly wrong about the subjective preferences of those who
returned.
3 Non-Subjective Reasons
Perhaps the problem is that we are focusing too much on the subjective
preferences of those who returned. In 2.1 I will consider the claim that, if
data is disclosed, facilitators will be more accountable, and so other future
refugees will experience a more ethical return, even if past refugees' privacy
will be undermined. I shall ultimately conclude that this does not give us a
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decisive reason to disclose the data. In 2.2 I argue that we should instead
consider whether those who already returned have object-given reasons to
disclose their data. These are reasons an individual has for acting a certain
way, even if they do not subjectively feel they have these reasons. However,
some may claim that this ignores subject-given reasons, which are reasons
a subject would actually give for their actions. In 2.3 I argue that such
subject-given reasons are not accounted for, regardless, when we keep data
private. As such, we should place greater weight on object-given reasons to
disclose the data.
3.1 Future Returnees
Lives may be lost if we do not look at the data. Though privacy is important,
future refugees will repatriate through coercion and misinformation if facil-
itators are never held accountable for past misinformed or coerced returns.
If beneﬁts are substantial, even a non-consequentialist may prefer breaching
privacy.
But breaching privacy may, in the long term, undermine informed consent
for repatriation itself. If refugees cannot be certain their data will be secure,
they may refuse to give real answers when asked, Why are you returning?
This may impair facilitators ability to ensure refugees are returning as freely
as possible, and as informed as possible. For example, if a refugee hides
the fact that she is homeless, out of fear that this will later be released to
researchers, a facilitator will do little to help end such homelessness. Simi-
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larly, if a refugee refuses to say her sexual orientation, for fear her privacy
will be breached, then the facilitator cannot respond with information about
the risks for homosexuals in the country the refugee is returning to. If fa-
cilitators are today warning individuals about risks in light of information
refugees give them, then violating privacy may undermine current practices
for ensuring informed consent.
Even if disclosing data will not undermine informed consent for repatri-
ation, it may put the lives of past refugees at risk. As noted above, data
can be leaked, and the more who see the data, the greater the risks.13 Even
if such consequences will not come about, it still seems wrong to look at
personal data without consent. This is because the principle of informed
consent is intended to be agent-speciﬁc. The aggregate beneﬁt for other
future refugees should not simply be weighed against the possible harm to-
wards past returnees whose privacy we are invading. A returnee may not
want anyone to know their personal information, such as their sexual ori-
entation, or perhaps extremely personal reasons for choosing to repatriate,
such as marital problems. If some acts are wrong even if they help many
other people, it seems important to consider reasons related to the returnees
themselves, and not other refugees who have yet to return.
13T Schonfeld, JS Brown, NJ Amoura, B Gordon, You don't know me, but...: Access




Object-given reasons are derived from objective facts about the world,
rather than reasons the subject would herself give. In Parﬁt's example, a
person comes upon a poisonous snake. The snake is more likely to bite
her if she runs away, as it is hostile towards moving targets. She doesn't
know this. She starts to run. She has a subject-given reason to run, but
also a very good countervailing reason not to: the snake will bite her. This
countervailing reason is derived from the objective facts that running away
from this type of snake leads them to bite us, and that the subject does not
want to be bitten.14 Though these reasons for standing still would not be
given by the subject, they are also not subject-neutral. They can concern
the interests of the subject alone, in this case her interests to not be bitten.
In this sense, it is diﬀerent than either asking the subject what she wants,
and also diﬀerent than asking what everyone else would want.
To consider if data should be disclosed, we can consider whether returnees
have object-given reasons to disclose their data. Many did before returning.
Had they agreed to keep their ﬁles open, their return would be less coercive
and more informed, which many preferred. In other words, they had reasons
to disclose their data derived from the fact that discloser encourages a more
informed and less coerced return, and the fact that they preferred to have a
more informed and less coercive return. However, as I already noted, these
earlier reasons are not relevant after return, because it is too late; if their
14Parﬁt ibid
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return was uninformed and coerced, there is nothing to do now once they
have returned.
Though refugees have no reasons derived from empirical facts about the
world, they may still have object-given reason to disclose their data. Some
object-given reasons are derived not from empirical facts about the world,
but from moral facts or professional codes.
For example, let us say a ﬁreﬁghter can easily put out a ﬁre that would
otherwise kill someone, but does not want to, because she is in the middle of
her lunch break. We may think, She has a very good reason to put out that
ﬁre. Though she herself would not give a reason, she has a reason derived
from the codes of conduct of her profession, or because as humans we have
a moral duty to sometimes save lives if we easily can.15 Similar to other
object-given reasons, these moral object-given reasons needn't be subject-
neutral. To determine if a person has a reason to help others, we consider
how much their own welfare is at stake. We would not, for example, claim
that a ﬁreﬁghter has the duty to sacriﬁce her own life to put out the ﬁre to
save two other lives in the building. It may even be morally impermissible to
do so if she is holding a baby in her arms, and the baby would be killed. One
important non-consequentialist consideration is the absolute risks to harm
an individual would face, and possibly the risks to children in their care.
In this sense, appealing to object-given reasons allows us to move beyond




In the case of repatriation, those who returned may have object-given
reasons to disclose data to help other refugees, but unless one is an agent-
neutral consequentialist, the aggregate consequences for others are not the
only facts to consider. If disclosing their data risks their lives or the lives
of their children, these returnees do not have moral object-given reasons to
disclose data, even if it helps others. If, on the other hands, returnees would
not be at risk from disclosing the data, and the data will reveal if they gave
valid consent to repatriating, then they have reasons to disclose the data.
If we were certain of the subjective preferences of returnees, then these
would be decisive. At the very least, they would hold greater weight than
the object-given reasons I describe. However, when we do not know these
preferences, object-given reasons become relevant, and must hold signiﬁcant
weight.
3.3 Why this does not ignore subjective preferences
Does this approach ignore subjective preferences? There is one sense in
which it does not.
Whenever we appeal to notions of autonomy and consent in deciding how
to treat another person, and do not know their personal preferences, we often
appeal to general characteristics about the person. For example, if a patient
is in a coma, and her dog contracts a terminal illness, and we are not certain if
she would want to have her dog euthanised, we may consider if she generally
supports euthanasia for terminally ill and suﬀering dogs. If we have no
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such general characteristics, we may appeal to characteristics about people
in general. We might, for example, consider if dog owners tend to support
euthenizing terminally ill dogs who are suﬀering. This same reasoning is
currently applied to data privacy rules. It is generally accepted today that,
because humans generally care about privacy, then this is evidence that many
would not want their data disclosed unless asked. As such, when refugees
repatriate, their data is kept private.
However, humans in general care about other values, besides privacy.
They care about altruism. If, in general, this is true, then this is evidence
that many returnees would want to disclose their data. If we keep data
locked in a ﬁle cabinet, never holding repatriation facilitators accountable,
we may be failing to respect their subjective preferences. To assume those
who returned do not care about this hardly ensures their preferences are
fulﬁlled.
Of course, humans care about more than just privacy and altruism, and
each human cares about something slightly unique to herself. Unfortunately,
we do not know these unique characteristics. Focusing on object-given rea-
sons does not ignore subjective preferences. It simply provides an alternative
consideration when we do not know what these subjective preferences are.
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4 Weighing Reasons Against Each Other
Though object-given reasons are important, and are decisive when we have
no information about subjective preferences, sometimes we do have partial
evidence about subjective preferences. When we do, we must determine how
we weigh object-given reasons against possible subject-given ones.
We can divide the reasons discussed so far into four possible categories:
1. Object-given reasons to disclose data
2. Object-given reasons to not disclose data, such as the eﬀect it will have
on the safety of past returnees
3. Predictions of possible subject-given reasons to disclose data, such as
altruism or other personal reasons
4. Predictions of possible subject-given reasons to not disclose data, such
as privacy or other personal reasons
If we were certain about a person's subject-given reasons, they might be
the only ones that matter.16 In this case, though, we are uncertain what
individuals want, and can only hypothesize. In contrast, we can be relatively
certain about some moral object-given reasons without looking at personal
data. Perhaps the existence of certain object-given reasons should tip the
16I assume that data disclosure is like surgery or sex: one's will is decisive, and that is the
end of it. See D Groll, Paternalism, respect, and the will author. Ethics 122(4)(2012):692
720[2028?]
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balance against possible subject-given ones. Whether they do depends on
ﬁve considerations.
4.1 Weak Object-Given Reasons
Imagine a person is returning from Israel to Canada. They are unlikely to
have been misinformed, or misinformed enough for us to claim their con-
sent was invalid for such a safe choice. In such cases, there are only weak
object-given reasons to disclose the data, because disclosing data does not
signiﬁcantly help to ensure informed consent in future repatriation. The sub-
ject is also unlikely to have subject-given reasons relating to altruism. If we
were able to ask the subject, they would unlikely think, I am helping others
if I disclose data. For, the data is not particularly helpful for others. In
these cases, the possible subject-given reasons related to privacy are decisive,
and data should not be looked at.
Object-given reasons can also be weak if disclosing data leads to detri-
mental consequences for the returnee. This might be case, for example, if
disclosing data increases the chances of it being leaked to government au-
thorities in the country the refugee returned to. Just as a ﬁreﬁghter has no
decisive object-given reasons to sacriﬁce her life, because this is too demand-
ing, no refugee would have a decisive object-given reason sacriﬁce her life
for others. They would also unlikely to have subject-given reasons to, given
that their lives are at stake.
Unfortunately, there is a correlation between the risks of disclosing data,
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and the beneﬁts of disclosing this data for others. It is precisely those who
would be at risk from data leaking who we most want to know about, to ﬁnd
out if they were informed about the risks of return.
For example, consider the case of Ahmad, a Darfur refugee suﬀering
from a mental illness, who was completely dependent on the wider Sudanese
community in Israel to eat, dress, and access shelter. After years of the
community sacriﬁcing sparse resources for his survival in Israel, they told
him to go to a psychiatric institution. He went, but left two days later.
Community members, including those who fed and sheltered him, organized
a meeting to decide what to do. He was not in attendance.
We think it is best for you to return to Sudan, they told him the next
day. He objected. After more pressure, he ﬁnally went with a friend to a
special unit of the Israeli Ministry of Interior (MOI) and asked to repatriate.
The MOI provided him with a ticket and the location of the airport in
Israel. He failed to show up at the airport, and was again pressured by the
community to ask the MOI for help. At the second interview, the MOI oﬃcial
asked him, impatiently, Do you really want to repatriate? He responded
that he no longer wished to repatriate, as he was too afraid. The oﬃcial then
told Ahmad that he could receive 500 Euro if he returned within a month. He
agreed to return, and boarded a ﬂight for Sudan, via Addis, in the summer
of 2013. After repatriation, he disappeared at the airport in Khartoum, and
no friends and colleagues in Israel or Sudan managed to locate him.17
17I learned of this story from a member of the Sudanese community who had monitored
the meetings leading up to his repatriation. Muhammad, personal interview, Tel Aviv, 8
August 2013
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In Sudan, it is a criminal oﬀense, punishable by death, to go to Israel.
If so, it is surprising that the 500 Euro would be reason enough for him to
repatriate. There is a strong likelihood that he was uninformed about the
repercussions of repatriation, or lacked the mental capacity to comprehend
the repercussions. Though disclosing data may place him at risk if the data
leaked to Sudanese authorities, it is precisely because of these risks to his life
that we may most wish to look at his data, to hold repatriation facilitators
accountable.
We might think that Ahmad is unlike other cases. It was not that he
lacked information or was forced to return, but that he lacked capacity. As
such, rather than considering what he had object-given reasons to want, we
should consider what was in his interests. This is the approach we take
with incompetent patients;18 if a patient is in a coma, or has severe mental
impairments, then a surrogate will often consider whether releasing their
data will harm the patient, with harm deﬁned in terms of their health and
psychological well-being. The same approach might be taken with refugees
who returned. Refugees like Ahmad must have their interests considered,
rather than what they had object-given reasons to do. However, even if
Ahmad did not have full capacity, we must look at his psychiatric reports to
validate this. To decide whether to look at these reports, we must consider
if he had an object-given reason to disclose these reports. Ultimately, it
seems he may had no such reason if doing so risked his life. The object-given
reasons here are therefore weak. The subject-given reasons are possibly also
18N Cantor, The bane of surrogate decision-making: deﬁning the best interests of never-
competent persons. Journal of Legal Medicine 26(2)(2005):155205
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weak, as he would unlikely have a preference to disclose his data if this risks
his life.
Perhaps researchers can take precautions to keep his data secure or only
request data that would not disclose his identity. Nonetheless, NGOs and
government agencies would possible be justiﬁed in not disclosing his case ﬁle,
if the consequences of it leaking are great enough. Unfortunately, if these
NGOs and government agencies do not disclose this data, researchers would
have no way of holding them accountable. There is clearly an unfortunate
correlation between the type of data disclosure that would hold repatriation
facilitators accountable, and the type of data disclosure that would risk the
lives of returnees. We could make the same claim about our ﬁreﬁghter. It
is often the case that a ﬁreﬁghter sacriﬁcing her life would save more people
than not sacriﬁcing her life. There is a correlation between the sacriﬁce for
her and the beneﬁts for others. She still does not have a moral obligation
to sacriﬁce her life. Similarly, the risks of harm from disclosing data seem
to weaken the object-given reason to disclose the data, and also weaken
evidence of subject-given reasons to disclose the data.
4.2 Strong Evidence of Subject-Given Reasons
When we have strong evidence of subject-given reasons against data disclo-
sure, we must consider if the evidence outweighs the importance of certain
object-given reasons to disclose the data.
For example, some NGOs specialize in returning victims of human traf-
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ﬁcking. Many victims of traﬃcking do not want their personal data disclosed
because the details are especially private. A similar claim may be made with
regards to those who suﬀer from mental illnesses, information that may be
especially sensitive for those who returned. If researchers know that those
who returned fall into one or both these categories, this could be evidence
of subject-given reasons to not want their data disclosed.
A returnee may also have already refused to give personal information,
and so would unlikely to consent to disclosing their personal ﬁles. For exam-
ple, if a refugee has already been approached by a researcher, and the refugee
stated that they do not wish to provide any personal information, then this
evidence of their preferences would outweigh the object-given reasons to dis-
close the data. It would almost be a case of an autonomous choice, and
outside the scope of the very hard cases I address, where we know almost
nothing about subjective preferences of those who returned.
Other times, a returnee has talked to a researcher in the past, describing
a course of events that can be conﬁrmed by looking at their personal ﬁles.
Because the subject has already provided the data verbally in an interview,
she would likely have subject-given reasons to disclose her data. Consider
Adut, who I interviewed in 2012. While speaking into a recorder, she told me
she had never lived in South Sudan, her parents having ﬂed to Egypt before
she was born. She married in Egypt, where she had thee children, but was
abused by her husband throughout their marriage. In 2010, while in Israel,
she tried to murder her infant son. She went on trial, and the judge placed her
in a hospital and her infant son in an orphanage. Shortly after, her husband
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returned to South Sudan with their three eldest children, and Adut asked
OBI for help returning, because she wanted divorce her husband and gain
custody of her three eldest children. Her psychiatrist initially stated that
she lacked the capacity to decide to return. OBI talked to the psychiatrist,
Adut tells me. After that, he changed his mind.19
I tried contacting Adut several times throughout 2013. Someone else
would always answer her phone, and state that she did not know where
Adut was. I spoke with a UN oﬃcial in Israel who was familiar with her
case, and a documentary ﬁlmmaker who was making a ﬁlm about her life.
Both could not contact her. Nor could her mother in Australia, who had
eventually adopted her infant son. I also failed to ﬁnd her when I was in
South Sudan in 2013 and 2014. Because of this, she could not give explicit
consent for me to see the court document, her psychiatric medical history,
and the questionnaire she ﬁlled out before return. As with Ahmad, even
if she was misinformed about return or lacked capacity, we only know this
for certain by looking at her reports. Unlike with Ahmad, the fact that she
disclosed this data in an interview is evidence that she had subject-given
reasons to disclose this information. This fact, combined with the object-
given reasons, is enough to justify disclosing her data.
19Mollie Gerver (2015), Repatriation and voluntariness, International Journal of Human
Rights
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4.3 Strong Object-Given Reasons
Sometimes object-given reasons are especially strong. This would be the case
if we suspect, from other evidence, that facilitators misinformed refugees or
coerced them to leave, but looking at the data is necessary to conﬁrm our
suspicions.
For example, government agencies and NGOs facilitating repatriation
may clearly lack information on countries they are helping refugees return
to. This would be strong evidencethat there was a lack of informed consent,
but not certain. When I spoke to the HIAS director in Israel, he emphasized
how much more South Sudanese asylum seekers knew about SouthSudan
compared to HIAS, and how important it was to listen to the information
refugees gave HIAS.20 This was despite the fact that nearly all the returnees
I interviewed in South Sudan had been born outside of, or had grown up
outside of, South Sudan. Some had been born in Egypt, had not been in
touch with anyone in South Sudan before return, and had never been to
sub-Saharan Africa. If NGOs facilitating repatriation do not know about
the country of origin, and those returning probably don't either, this is par-
tial evidence there was no informed consent, but not complete evidence A
government dataset also revealed that most returning had either never lived
in South Sudan or had left as small children. This is partial evidence that
there was no informed consent, but not complete evidence. It seems espe-
cially important to look at data, assuming no refugees will be at risk from
20HIAS, Personal Interview, Jerusalem, 11 December 2012
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data leaking. This moral object-given reason to look at the data should
have greater weight, even when there is only weak evidence of subject-given
reasons to look at the data.
For example, Stephen, Yasmin and Joseph all said, in interviews, that
they were never warned of the risks. To conﬁrm if this is true, we need to
look at their data. We should do this even though all three also said they
did not feel wronged by the NGOs, and would unlikely have felt a subjective
need to disclose their data to hold the NGOs accountable. When we already
strongly suspect that NGOs did not provide accurate information, it is more
important to establish this than to respect the possible preferences of those
who returned.
4.4 Partial Data to Avoid Dilemma
There are cases where the object-given reasons are very strong, but so is
the evidence of possible subject-given reasons. I met one woman in Aweil in
South Sudan who did not want to be interviewed. We might feel she really
would not have consented to data disclosure, but disclosing her data seemed
especially important, as she was living in extreme poverty after return. Ah-
mad's case may be similar. He had strong object-given reasons to disclose
the data, but they do not seem decisive, because of risks.
When we are still uncertain as to which reasons are decisive, we could
compromise by only disclosing relevant data, and redacting the rest. Yet,
in many cases, ﬁnding out if a professional body is blameworthy requires
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looking at all data on the aggregate level. This is partly to ensure we don't
wrongly blame repatriation facilitators. Facilitators cannot be expected to
prevent all repatriation that is without informed consent. If we look at some
cases, and learn that refugees were poorly informed, we cannot be certain
if these cases are representative. For this we must looking at all data, or a
random sample.
For example, HIAS provided me partial answers from the case ﬁles of
approximately 60 returnees. The ﬁles made clear that some returnees did
not understand what they were returning to, and were largely repatriating
because they had no refugee status in Israel. While this was of beneﬁt for
research, the beneﬁt was severely limited. Such partial data could possibly
violate both subject-given reasons relating to privacy without the beneﬁt of
the object-given reasons. For, we are looking at data without consent and
also without much beneﬁt for future returnees, because we do not know how
pervasive coercion and misinformation is. Those who returned may also have
been less likely to subjectively support such data disclosure if it does not help
protect future returnees. Full data may uphold autonomy and object-given
reasons more than partial data.
4.5 Enabling
There is a ﬁnal consideration we might appeal to when no reason seems
decisive, but some choice must be made.
When we consider what principles to protect, we often consider whether,
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in protecting the principle, we are undermining it. For example, if a per-
son marches down the street, stating she will harm anyone who speaks out
against the status quo, her freedom of speech should not be protected. For, in
protecting her freedom of speech, we are undermining the freedom of speech
of others, who now will be too afraid to speak out. When a principle is used
to undermine itself, it seems less legitimate use the principle in this manner.
When NGOs, the UN, and governments follow the principle of informed
consent with data privacy, this enables them to facilitate coerced and mis-
informed repatriation. This is not simply a conﬂict between rights. Rather,
protecting informed consent at one point is used to undermine it at another,
and so the principle of informed consent should be temporarily put aside.
We might still be concerned that disclosing data is using refugees who
have returned, violating their right to privacy for the sake of future refugees'
right to informed consent in repatriation. Furthermore, we do not know that
NGOs and governments are using a principle to undermine itself. Rather,
we just suspect this might be the case.
Though our concern for privacy should remain, it should not take priority
because of an important asymmetry. If data is kept in a ﬁling cabinet, we
may be undermining informed consent for repatriation, because facilitators
will not be held accountable, and we may also be undermining informed con-
sent for data disclosure, because some returnees will not be able to disclose
data they would have wanted disclosed, for altruistic reasons. In contrast,
if we look at the data, we can at least ensure more informed consent for
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repatriation for the future, even though we may be undermining informed
consent for those who want to keep their data private. In other words, data
privacy can enable uninformed or coerced returns, but uninformed and co-
erced returns cannot enable the violation of data privacy. As such, there is
more at stake from keeping data private compared to what is at stake from
disclosing data.
If we knew what returnees wanted, or the object-given reasons were weak,
this would be irrelevant; the choice of the returnee would be decisive, or the
disclosure unjustiﬁed. Given that we do not know what returnees want, and
when no reason seems decisive, we look at the data.
5 Conclusion
Intervening in someone's life without their consent can result in the person
being unreachable. When people are unreachable, they cannot consent to us
looking at their data, including data that can determine if the intervention
was without informed consent.
It is tempting to simply appeal to the consequences of invading privacy.
Invading privacy can protect informed consent for others in the future and
so it is justiﬁed. Such simple consequentialist reasoning, however, is not
necessary. We can ask whether individuals have moral object-given reasons
to disclose their data. This can account for consequences, but also the limits
of what people should be morally expected to sacriﬁce. All of this, in turn,
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can still be weighed against possible subject-given reasons. And when no
reason seems decisive, we should disclose data, preventing coercive and un-
informed interventions, even while undermining privacy. Such an approach
can help ensure that the principle of informed consent is upheld, and does
not undermine itself.
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